reputational gains, and lax monitoring, none of which ever shows up explicitly in contracts, but each of which may be a very important part of the total compensation picture.
When we put these three complexities into one mix, we begin to see the difficulty of making sense of the entrepreneurial compensation quagmire. We rarely even know when the entrepreneurial function is being rewarded in corporate development (apart, perhaps, from the case of stock granted to a promoter on the formation of a firm), as there are too many confounding circumstances to allow discrete measurement. A corporate founder may also be the inventor of a product which is to be marketed by a company that he or she forms by assembling his or her own personal capital and labor and that of other contributors. The founder may own shares and, at the same time, draw a salary and other compensation, compete in the market for corporate managers, retire early, trade profitably in the stock market, and enjoy the regard of his or her community. Which of these is the entrepreneurial compensation, which is the return to capital, which is the managerial compensation, and which is just plain luck? No amount of regressing can give us a clear answer to this question.
To complicate matters further, we do not even have general agreement on exactly how to define the entrepreneurial function. The Austrian-school economists, particularly Israel Kirzner, have offered the most integrated, robust and consistent theory of the entrepreneur, although that approach is still handled at arm's length by most mainstream economists. combinations of resources, new ways of doing things, new products or innovations in marketing, a new organizational form, or, more succinctly, whatever shakes up the allocational status quo. But this approach, which is followed in this paper, with its focus on a kind of Knightian uncertainty 3 about what an entrepreneur will produce, confounds the compensation issue even more, since the output of the entrepreneurial function can never be anticipated or known in advance. If the innovation were predictable, it would no longer be entrepreneurial, and, as we have seen, even when its presence is sensed after the fact, it is generally too difficult to separate from other functions to allow precise reward. Still, we know that an entrepreneurial function exists because there could be no real economic progress without this function. Joseph Schumpeter pointed out long ago that entrepreneurship is the very factor which avoids a perfectly static equilibrium, a circular system with no progress or growth.
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So there is a howdy-do, an economic function necessary to the very idea of progress but with no obvious way of specifically identifying it or compensating for it. But the operative term there is "obvious," since we can surmise that, in one way or another, the function is being provided and, if it is being provided, then it is most likely being compensated for. Frank Knight's hunch that entrepreneurship in aggregate was provided freely in a market economy because of the truly "residual" nature of compensation for such services 5 may be correct, and there is some corroborating evidence for the proposition. 6 However, Knight's claim was made before anyone even recognized the finding a new way to organize the inputs on an assembly line, clearly a candidate for being called entrepreneurial, will usually not receive that same degree of attention or acclaim, at least until it shows up on the proverbial bottom line. Even then the real source of the revenue gain may be difficult to specify. Also, it may take years for the stock market to register the new value created, since the increase in accounting earnings may be years away. 9 The stock market may be efficient, but it must have information inputs to do its job.
9 This example is merely one of many reasons it would be better public policy to encourage early utilization of new information in the stock market instead of hindering, delaying and distorting it, as we now do:
The new approach would suggest that it is undesirable to have laws discouraging stock trading by anyone who has any knowledge relevant to the valuation of a security. Thus, assembly-line workers, administrative assistants, office boys, accountants, lawyers, salespeople, competitors, financial analysts and, of course, corporate executives (government officials are another story) should all be encouraged to buy or sell stocks based on any new information they might have. Only those privately enjoined by contract or other legal duty from trading should be excluded. We do sometimes recognize the innovations of employees (but never of outsiders) with such compensation forms as bonuses, new grants of stock or stock options, or increased salary. 10 Equity forms of compensation, such as stock or stock options, may also include a component for entrepreneurial actions to the extent that such compensation has an ex ante motivating force for innovation. But it is unlikely that these forms of compensation, without perhaps reaching enormous size, can ever motivate a desirable or efficient level of entrepreneurial activity. 11 Suffice it to say for now that they were never designed expressly with compensation for entrepreneurial services in mind. On that Schumpeter was certainly correct when he said that "the fact that personal gain, beyond salary and bonus cannot, in corporate business, be reaped by executives except by illegal or semiillegal practices shows precisely that the structural idea of the corporation is averse to it."
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There are fundamental problems with each of these as forms of compensation to the corporate entrepreneur, but Schumpeter was undoubtedly too hasty in proclaiming the large corporation as incompatible with innovation. I dealt with this topic some years ago 10 For a surprisingly inadequate discussion of these forms of entrepreneurial compensation in an otherwise superb discussion of the role of the entrepreneur in large firms, see Frederic E. Sautet, "An Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm," 2000, pp. 101-104. 11 We might debate about what the efficient or optimal level of entrepreneurial services is, since the function does not neatly fit into traditional economic analytics of efficient output. We can conceive of not having enough entrepreneurship, as is the case with many underdeveloped countries, but it is difficult to make sense of any concept of over-production of entrepreneurship. However, for the view that there is an optimal level of ignorance, see STIGLITZ, JOSEPH E., WHITHER SOCIALISM? 1994. Perhaps the statement in the text should refer to motivating entrepreneurial activity without reference to the amount as being efficient, and it might be one case in which the efficient level is also the maximum level. But in the scheme of using insider trading to compensate entrepreneurial activity, as proposed below, there could never be such a thing as "too much" incentive: if the development is not worthy, it will not be reflected in a higher stock price and, therefore, will not reward the developer.
12 SCHUMPETER, supra note 7, at 156 n.1. But, as we shall see, the system does allow an appropriate form of compensation, insider trading, although Schumpeter may have included that among the illegal or semiillegal forms of compensation. His failure to clarify this point has always been something of a mystery.
and will not repeat that discussion here. 13 But, for the most part, the problem is that the settling up with bonuses or additional compensation is always done post hoc and, therefore, is subject to great disagreement about the amount, the proper identity of the recipients of this extra compensation, and the correct evaluation of the individual's contribution and whether any reward is appropriate at all. This problem may be especially acute because of the special psychological characteristics of great entrepreneurs, most notably optimism, which Knight so insightfully noted.
14 Certain parts of the discussion I tried to initiate on this subject many years ago are perhaps even more relevant today than they were then. To be consistent with the idea of the entrepreneur as a creator of new combinations and the discoverer of new ideas or information, a system of compensation is required that can more precisely and more quickly measure the true present value of these contributions than can a compensation This analysis may also help explain a persistent conundrum in modern corporate economics: why are larger corporations, generally speaking, less entrepreneurial than smaller ones? Surely Schumpeter's pop-sociological theory that bureaucratic, risk-averse types will dominate large corporations is not a robust explanation. We see too many examples to the contrary. A more cogent answer flows directly from our assumptions regarding entrepreneurial personality, compensation, and a little arithmetic.
As a corporation grows in absolute size, the effect of any given development on share price becomes less and less in absolute terms. That is, a billion dollar development in a publicly-held corporation with a market capitalization of 50 billion dollars will have half But even without the implicit subsidy from insider trading regulation, the larger firms still have means to compete for entrepreneurial employees. To compete effectively in the market for entrepreneurial talent with the smaller publicly-held companies, the larger companies would have to -and do -offer higher salaries and other perks than would the smaller ones. Thus we have a new explanation for the correlation often found between the relative size of a company and the compensation levels of its executives. We may also have found a new and cogent, if partial, explanation for the apparently scandalously high salaries and other perks in the large, publicly-held companies that have come to public attention in recent years. It takes a lot of straight salary to compensate an executive for the loss of the right to trade on new information. As Jensen and Murphy argued many years ago, the form of compensation may count for more than the level, although they did not consider insider trading in the mix.
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For these reasons and perhaps others, specific amounts of salary or stock will probably never capture the essential required characteristic of effective entrepreneurial compensation. The incentive system must appeal to the confident nature of the entrepreneur as well as to the entrepreneurial instinct to "cash in big" from new contributions. 20 Facing a compensation committee's ex post evaluation of an invention will hardly appeal to this type of personality. As we have seen, all conventional compensation devices suffer from the problem of valuation of innovations as well that of determining the person directly responsible for a new development and deserving of reward, matters about which the innovator and his or her employer will almost certainly disagree.
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The incentive to act entrepreneurially must exist in advance of the contribution and with an understanding that in fact nothing of value may be developed, another reason that it is so difficult to design an ex ante compensation system for entrepreneurial developments in a large corporation. In this sense, compare the research scientist who is hired to invent or develop something, a cure for cancer for instance, with an inherently uncertain outcome.
There obviously can be no guarantee of the results of such research, and yet the compensation and its form must be appropriate to entice the person to do the work. A any wonder then that so many CEOs act like bureaucrats rather than the value-maximizing entrepreneurs companies need to enhance their standing in world markets?"). 20 In this context the stock option fails for the same reason as prior stock ownership does.
21 As well they should. These matters involve inherent uncertainty, and it can be safely predicted that mistakes will occur. The insider trading compensation device does not entirely dispense with these errors, but it does generally compensate for entrepreneurial activity while doing away with the disagreements and personal involvements in compensation decisions. Furthermore, it does no harm and entails some other real benefits in the process. See MANNE, supra note 13.
produced will neatly satisfy the requirements of an appropriate compensation system for this kind of effort. Furthermore, the incentive should ideally be able to go to any individual in the corporate system who might, whether predicted to or not, to make an entrepreneurial contribution. In some sense, it is a personality trait that the employer wants and not necessarily or exclusively an individual of known skills and propensities, although that too must occur. Allowing trading on new information produced will again satisfy this requirement.
So an entrepreneurial compensation system must possess some unusual characteristics if it is to successfully attract the sought-after services. It must appeal to the personality of the entrepreneurial type; it must avoid valuation and attribution issues post hoc; and it must ideally motivate any prospective employee to perform as an entrepreneur. It is impossible to find a system that will meet all these requirements other than the right of corporate employees with valuable new information to buy shares on that news in advance of public disclosure.
Insider trading as a form of compensation also has some peculiar characteristics that will distinguish it analytically from other forms of compensation. The most obvious difference is that the value of individual stock trades to be made in the future cannot by their nature be determined in advance, even though, as noted earlier, a real market value must be attached to a general right to engage in insider trading, a kind of generalized "call" on stock. It cannot be assumed, even with the most efficient stock market, that the profits from trading on inside information will correctly and precisely measure or evaluate a corporate entrepreneur's contributions, even though in some cases this allocation of trading profits may happen. Obviously, the amount of stock the insider is willing to purchase on the information that he or she created or learned will vary with a number of exogenous circumstances, including the availability of credit to the at any given moment reflect a variety of other information inputs, so that it will always be difficult to isolate and measure the value of one particular entrepreneurial development.
Similarly, trading quickly, i.e., buying and then selling right after the disclosure, merely reduces the risk of stock holding; it does not remove it entirely.
Still, insider trading is the system par excellence of compensating entrepreneurs in the large, publicly-held corporations, and it does not matter one whit that the amount the employee realizes by his or her trading may be more or less than the contribution is worth, that the wrong person may be rewarded with this right, that profit can be made from bad news as well as good news, or that the system might seem unfair to economicschallenged regulators and moralists. 23 The system, as we shall explain below, is the critical factor. Of course, there are myriad other considerations in the insider trading debate. The present discussion is limited to the appropriateness of insider trading as a form of entrepreneurial compensation in the large, publicly-held corporations.
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Unfortunately, only a handful of sources have addressed critically the entrepreneurial compensation argument which I offered in substantially these terms over forty years ago, 25 although several commentators have acknowledged the value of the right to trade various companies instead of going heavily into debt in order to fully exploit one significant piece of information. See MANNE, supra note 13, at 69-71. 23 There are after all other advantages to this system too, but they are not being discussed here. See generally MANNE, supra note 13. 24 The "mea culpa" I entered in my 2005 article, Manne, supra note 18, at 170-74, referred only to the problem of trying to design an executive compensation plan in advance utilizing the right to trade in shares as an explicit part of the package. I certainly did not intended to retract the idea that a general rule of allowing insider trading was the best device we could imagine for appropriately rewarding entrepreneurial services in the large, publicly-held corporations. Two factors have prevented this bit of "fairness" regulation from totally destroying large corporate enterprises in the fashion Schumpeter predicted. The first is that, at least until recently, we did not consider controlling the level of other forms of compensation which might -probably inefficiently and expensively -substitute for insider trading as an incentive system for entrepreneurial services. 28 The other is the near impossibility of effective enforcement of laws against insider trading. 29 While the publicity-motivated prosecutions and the propaganda system that have long characterized the SEC's campaign against insider trading deter some people from engaging in the practice, all indications are that it still flourishes, perhaps even done by the right people sometimes.
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Rarely is there a major news story about a corporation without prior movement in the indicated direction in the stock market. Someone is cashing in on the development; it would certainly be to everyone's benefit if it were generally the people responsible for it.
29 Among other reasons for this difficulty of enforcement is the fact that, under the right circumstances, as much gain can be had from knowing when not to sell or not to buy as from the obverse. But, since there is no "transaction," this is not generally a violation of Rule 10b-5. 
